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which fail commercially produce knowledge with some social value. Such knowledge is
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1 Introduction
Most R&D projects fail from a commercial point of view1, and technological shifts
may quickly turn even successful innovations into failure. This reflects the high
risk associated with research, but also that it is diﬃcult to appropriate the returns
to knowledge. For this reason it is possible that projects and firms that fail com-
mercially still produce knowledge with some social value. This possibility seems
particularly relevant for subsidized R&D, since subsidies are aimed at projects with
high risk and large externalities. The substantial amount of money spent by OECD
governments on R&D subsidies makes it important to test this hypothesis2. A pos-
sible ‘scrap value’ associated with unsuccessful projects and firms may significantly
influence the social returns to R&D and reduce the overall risk associated with
technology programs3. This issue has so far not been investigated in the technology
program evaluation literature, nor has there been much empirical analysis of labor
market knowledge flows or spin-oﬀ firms in general.
This paper analyzes a series of Norwegian IT programs so far considered un-
successful. Recently, however, it has been argued that knowledge built up in the
subsidized firms has been transmitted to a new generation of successful firms through
labor mobility. Using matched employer-emploee data, I test this hypothsis. Sci-
entists and engineers with experience from the subsidized IT-firms have to a much
larger extent than other scientists and engineers in high-tech industries migrated to
the rapitdly growing IT service industry. There is no evidence, however, indicating
that these scientists and engineers have played a particularly prominent role in the
growth process. Nor do spin-oﬀ firms from the subsidized firms perform particularly
well. One possible explanation for these discouraging results is that the technology
shift in the late 1980s rendered much of the intellectual human capital built up
under the programs obsolete.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section discuss labor
market knowledge flows in more detail. Section three discuss the data, the empirical
1Cf. e.g. Scherer and Harhoﬀ (2000). Analyzing several samples of innovations they find that
the top ten percent most valuable innovations capture from 48 to 93 percent of the total value.
2According to Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2000) the OECD average share of governments in
the funding of R&D performed by private firms was 10 percent in 1998. The share of government
funding in total R&D was 30 percent.
3Scherer and Harhoﬀ (2000) find that the estimated distributions of the returns to innovations
are so skewed that instability may extend to the level of a whole economy. The risk aspect seems
particularly relevant for small economies. While a large country like the US can be fairly confident
that it will host at least a few major successes like Microsoft, IBM or Intel, chance probably plays
a large role when a small country like Finland becomes the host of a giant like Nokia. Furthermore,
even if a small country succeed in breeding a major company, there is always the risk that the
company will be wiped out by a future technology shock. The extent to which knowledge built
up in high tech firms can be applied elsewhere in the economy and generate spin-oﬀs, therefore, is
particularly important for small countries spending money to subsidize commercial R&D.
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approach and the definition of key variables. Section four gives a brief description of
aggregate subsidies and growth in the Norwegian IT and high-tech industries, and
analyzes the flow of scientists and engineers out of subsidized and non-subsidized
firms. Section five analyze the value of experience from subsidized IT-firms using
wage regressions on a sample of scientists and engineers with experience from high-
tech and IT-industries. Section six analyze the performance of spin-oﬀ firms, while
section seven concludes.
2 The importance of analyzing knowledge flows
Since research is a learning process, knowledge built up through failed projects
and firms is likely to be embodied in workers or teams of workers. In order to
assess the value of such knowledge, it is necessary to trace workers as they move
across firms and industries seeking to maximize the returns to their human capital.
Consider the early days of the semiconductor industry as an example of the potential
importance of this approach. If evaluating the social returns to R&D contracts
awarded pioneering firms such as Sprague Electric, Shockley or Fairchild based on
the performance of these firms alone, it seems clear from historical accounts that
the return would appear modest. Yet, it is well documented that key technologies
later utilized in the semiconductor industry by tremendously successful companies
like Intel, was developed in these early entrants and transferred by employees to
new firms better suited to exploit the technologies commercially, see e.g. Holbrook
et al. (2000), Jackson (1997) or Saxenian (1994).
The recent availability of large matched employer-employee data sets makes it
possible to analyze statistically the importance of human capital and employee mo-
bility suggested by such case studies4. Furthermore, tracing knowledge flows by
following employees is not only relevant when firms fail. It can also be useful when
analyzing particularly successful firms and technologies, since entrepreneurs often
‘cash out’ on their investments by selling their company to larger, established firms.
In conventional, firm-level data sets, such companies disappear without there being
any indication of what happened. This problem may be particularly important when
evaluating programs targeted at start-up firms and small businesses5. Analysis of
the opposite process, i.e. the formation of spin-oﬀ firms, is also facilitated within
a framework where employees are followed over time and across firms. Employee
mobility and spin-oﬀ firms are closely related phenomena. Again, consider the semi-
conductor industry as an example. According to Saxenian (1994, p. 31), writing
about Silicon Valley,
4An alternative approach is illustrated by Almeida and Kogut (1999) analysing patenting and
patent citation patterns among engineers that change employers.
5The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the US would be an example of
such a program, cf. e.g. Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000).
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“Many of the region’s entrepreneurs and managers speak of Fairchild as
an important managerial training ground. ... To this day a poster of
the corporate genealogy of the scores of Fairchild spin-oﬀs, hangs on the
walls of many Silicon Valley firms.”
In the present paper, I illustrate how the ideas outlined above can be imple-
mented and analyzed. Matched employer-employee data are used to ‘re-evaluate’ a
series of Norwegian technology programs in the 1980s that subsidized IT manufac-
turing firms. A previous evaluation by Klette and Møen (1999) concluded that “the
IT-programs were largely unsuccessful”. Recently, however, claims have been made
that the growth of the Norwegian IT-industry in the late 1990s was stimulated by
knowledge built up in formerly subsidized firms. In particular, employees of the
fallen industry leader, Norsk Data, have been pointed to as key contributors in a
new generation of successful firms. Norsk Data was a ‘national champion’ and a
leading minicomputer company6. It was the second largest company on the Oslo
Stock Exchange in the mid 1980s, but had considerable diﬃculties in adapting to
the technology shift in the late 1980s represented by the introduction of PCs and
open standards. In 1989 mass layoﬀs were unavoidable and in 1991 it closed down
its manufacturing plants7.
One expression of the idea that Norsk Data had a lasting impact on the industry,
can be found in a publication from the Research Council of Norway (2000) presenting
IT (ICT8) firms and technologies that have benefitted from R&D subsidies. In the
introduction the Council states that9
“[t]he bankruptcy in Norsk Data received much attention, and left the
impression that the Norwegian ICT industry was severely injured. This
was not the case. Know-how was embedded in the employees, and these
employees were rather quickly absorbed by other Norwegian ICT-firms.”
It may not be very surprising that the Research Council in this way tries to
improve upon the public impression of Norsk Data, given that the firm had received
6The company experienced a 40 percent average annual sales growth from 1973 to 1986, and
50 percent average annual growth in profits during the same period. It was considered the third
most profitable computer company in the world, and the stocks were traded in Oslo, Stockholm,
Frankfurt, London and New York. Cf. Steine (1992) and articles published in the business press
for more information about the history of this company.
7What little was left of the company went bankrupt in 1993.
8I do not make any distinction between the concepts IT - information technology - and ICT
- information and communication technologies. The latter abbreviation is of more recent origin,
and its use seems to be associated with the growth of the IT service sector.
9In my translation.
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massive subsidies10. A similar, but even stronger statement, however, was made by
Norway’s leading engineering magazine, Teknisk Ukeblad, one year earlier. In the
fall of 1999, this bulletin of the Norwegian Engineering Association wanted to elect
the ‘engineering achievement of the century’11. Second of ten nominees was Norsk
Data. The magazine argued that this ‘industrial adventure ... left behind a thousand
professionals whose knowledge still fertilize Norwegian information technology”12.
It seems that the statements quoted above are based on knowledge about a hand-
ful of cases. Both the Research Council and Teknisk Ukeblad mention e.g. Dolphin
Interconnect Solutions, a company that came out of the R&D department in Norsk
Data when it closed down. In 2000 a part of Dolphin was sold to Sun Microsystems
and in the business press, the price was pictured as sensational. Such ‘spin-oﬀ re-
turns’ from previous investments cannot be captured by ordinary microeconometric
program evaluation methodologies which focus on the performance of the subsidized
firms13. In order to evaluate whether Dolphin and similar cases are representative,
a quantitative framework utilizing matched employer-employee data is called for.
3 Data and empirical approach
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from four main sources: Governmental adminis-
trative records prepared by Statistics Norway, the biannual R&D survey conducted
by the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and Statis-
tics Norway, the manufacturing statistics of Statistics Norway, and the statistics
of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies prepared by Creditinform and
Statistics Norway. The Norwegian data are extraordinary in the sense that the en-
10Norsk Data was the largest recipient among firms subsidized by the National Program for
Information Technology lasting from 1987 to 1990, and received more than 12 percent of the
budget allocated to commercial R&D under the program. Given the size of the company, this
does not necessarily imply that the subsidies were large relative to Norsk Data’s private R&D
investments, but money from the National Program for Information Technology came on top of
subsidies from preceding programs and substantial public procurements which were used actively
to help the company develop new technology throughout its history. Cf. Harlem et al. (1990) and
Bjerkan and Nerg˚ard (1990).
11Cf. Valmot (1999). A list of all nominees is given in the same journal (Teknisk Ukeblad),
August 12th 1999, pp 10-11.
12My translation. Spelled out in more detail: “All over Norway we see spin-oﬀ eﬀects from the
Norsk Data era; thousands of people that worked in or with Norsk Data built up know-how whose
existence it is hard to imagine without this company. Many of these people started new firms
together with old colleagues or business contacts, others have contributed with their experience
in other sectors of the economy.” The article was titled “The lighthouse of the Norwegian IT-
industry”.
13Cf. Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000) for a review.
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tire working population can be traced across employers over more than a decade,
and in the sense that extremely rich information is available both about the workers
and about their employers. The data appendix gives further details and descriptive
statistics.
3.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis under consideration is whether the boom in R&D subsidies and
R&D investments in the Norwegian IT manufacturing industry in the mid and late
1980s, later caused growth in this or other sectors of the economy. Establishing such
a causal link is demanding and involves constructing a counterfactual situation for
the firms and workers involved.
Compared to the standard program evaluation literature, cf. e.g. Heckman,
Lalonde and Smith (1999), several complications are present. First, the ‘treatment’
is not dichotomous. R&D investments have both an intensity dimension and a time
dimension. Moreover, there is no clear-cut start of the program as various technology
programs have replaced each other for several decades prior to the period that can
be observed14. Also, the selection problem, fundamental to all program evaluation
where participation is not randomized, has a peculiar twist. There is a ‘double
selection’ process where firms are selected into programs, and workers self-select into
firms. Deciding on a relevant and valid comparison group under these circumstances
is diﬃcult.
My responses to the problems listed above will be as follows: First, with respect
to the intensity and time dimension of treatment, I will use a regression framework so
that continuous variables can be utilized in addition to a dichotomous classification,
based on cut-oﬀ values. Next, with respect to missing data for previous programs,
little can be done. I will, however, argue below that this is not a severe obstacle.
Finally, my response to the potential selection problem will be to allow for individual
fixed eﬀects. A more explicit approach to the selection problem does not seem
necessary. Negative selection is not particularly relevant since R&D programs are
meant to stimulate high quality research15, and positive selection creates a bias
against my conclusion that the programs were not successful.
3.3 How to define ‘treatment’
Defining high-tech, R&D firms and IT R&D-firms Treatment, in the con-
text of this paper, is having experience from a subsidized R&D firm in the IT
14Cf. Klette and Møen (1999) for details.
15This is not to say that negative selection could not exist. Various political economy processes
may lead the subsidies to troubled firms, cf. Klette and Møen (1999) for a discussion. Then,
however, the programs would not look successful, nor be successful.
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manufacturing industry. In principle, therefore, we would like to compare similar
workers with experience from IT-firms with and without subsidies. However, it is
diﬃcult to define an IT-industry since information technology does not constitute
a separate class in standard industrial classification schemes16. Too narrow a set
of classes will leave out a lot of true IT-firms, whereas a broader set will include
a lot of non-IT firms. I get around this problem by utilizing a unique variable in
the R&D surveys which identify the IT-content in each firm’s R&D investments.
Using this variable in combination with R&D man-years, I define IT R&D-firms in
the manufacturing sector as firms with an intensity17 of IT-related R&D above 10
percent18. This definition is designed to exclude a large number of firms that per-
form small IT projects without having information technology as their main focus
or being technologically advanced. Almost without exception, units classified as IT
R&D-firms according to this criteria belong to ISIC 382-385, i.e. the machinery,
electronics, transportation equipment and technical instruments industries19. I will
hereafter refer to these industries together as ‘high-tech’. Out of 1173 plants (consti-
tuting 957 firms) with known R&D in the high-tech industries in the period 1986 to
1991, 197 plants belong to ‘R&D firms’ having an intensity of total R&D20 above 10
percent. Out of these, 108 belong to ‘IT R&D-firms’, i.e. firms having an intensity
of IT-related R&D above 10 percent. There are on average 4.0 observations of each
plant in the years 1986 to 199021.
Defining subsidized firms Since subsidies are awarded unevenly among recipi-
ents, there is also a problem of how to define a subsidized IT R&D-firm (hereafter
referred to as a subsidized firm). For a subsidy to have an eﬀect on a firm’s research
activities, it must be of some significance. Hence, any subsidy should not qualify,
and I define the treatment group as IT R&D-firms with an intensity of subsidized
IT-related R&D above 0.5 percent. For a treatment firm with an intensity of IT-
related R&D at the lower limit, i.e. 10 percent, this implies that at least 5 percent
of the firm’s IT-R&D must be subsidized22. The criteria is designed so that all large
16Cf. e.g. OECD (2000). The Norwegian industrial classification scheme was based on ISIC rev.
2 until 1993/94. Since then NACE rev. 1 (ISIC rev. 3) has been used.
17R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee (per year) at the three-digit line
of business level within firms. Cf. the data appendix for more information. In the text, I will not
distinguish between firms and lines of business within firms.
18These variables are not available, nor as relevant, for the IT service sector. This sector will be
defined using the OECD definition based on industrial classification codes.
19The equivalent NACE classifications are NACE 29-35.
20The sum of IT and non-IT R&D.
21Note that firms, and thereby plants, can change category between years. When giving the
number of plants in diﬀerent categories above, plants are counted as belonging to an R&D firm or
IT R&D firm if it has this status in at least one of the years 1986-1991.
22I know for each firm the share of R&D that is classified as IT, but not the share of subsidies used
in IT-projects. However, since the government had IT high on its agenda, I assume that R&D-
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subsidy recipients known from other sources, that can be identified in the data, are
included23. Out of 108 plants belonging to IT R&D-firms in the period 1986 to 1990,
79 belong to subsidized firms.
Defining the treatment period Data on individual workers start in 1986, and
the era of large R&D subsidies ended in 1990, cf. Figure 1 below. Hence, I will
consider the years 1986 to 1990 to be the ‘treatment period’. As mentioned, there
were targeted IT-programs prior to 1986, but I do not believe the lack of data from
these early years is a severe restriction. The largest R&D subsidy program were in
eﬀect from 1987 to 1990, and the largest IT R&D contracts were awarded in the
years 1985 to 198724. Furthermore, with some stability in employment relationships,
a certain persistence in program participation, and both a lag and some persistence
in the eﬀect of subsidies, there will be a positive correlation between the unobserved
and the observed treatment. It is, however, somewhat unfortunate that workers
cannot be observed in a pre-treatment period, so that a clean comparison of pre and
post treatment wages can be undertaken as part of the program evaluation.
Categorizing workers I want to assess the value of the core technological know-
how built up in the subsidized firms. This know-how is likely to be possessed by
scientists and engineers, and my analysis will therefore focus on this group. With the
treatment period lasting from 1986 to 1990, many scientists and engineers will have
had several employers, and firms may also have changed subsidy status within this
time interval. I categorize scientists and engineers as having ‘experience from subsi-
dized firms’ if they are attached to a subsidized firm in at least one year. Similarly
scientists and engineers are categorized as having ‘experience from IT R&D-firms’
and ‘experience from R&D-firms’ if they have at least one year experience from such
firms in 1986 to 1990.
Using these definitions, there are 1755 scientists and engineers with experience
from R&D-firms. Out of these 1290 have experience from IT-R&D firms. In this
group 1095 have experience from subsidized firms. About a quarter of the workers
in subsidized firms were employed by the industry leader, Norsk Data. The numbers
are based on a sample of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 and employed
subsidies awarded firms that report to do IT R&D is related to their IT-projects. If subsidies
exceed a firm’s IT R&D-investments, the excess subsidies are excluded.
23The ten largest recipients received 35 percent of the funds. These firms were producing elec-
tronic products, telecommunication equipment, instruments and computers. According to Harlem
et al. (1990), the ten largest recipients were Norsk Data, Autodisplay, EB Nera, Nordic VLSI, EB,
LCD Vision, Seatex, Micron, Simrad Subsea and Alcatel/STK. The order reflects the size of the
funding.
24The implementation and organization of the National Program for Information Technology is
extensively documented in Harlem et al. (1990) and Buland (1996).
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full time in a high-tech firm at least one of the years 1986 to 199025. Altogether
there are 3784 scientists and engineers in the sample. 3419 of these are in firms with
known R&D-investments.
Continuous treatment variables The firm categories defined above are based
on cut-oﬀ values for R&D intensities that are somewhat arbitrary, and that conceal
a significant amount of variation in research and ‘program’ exposure. The intensity
of R&D and subsidies varied between firms within each category, and within firms
over time. Furthermore, workers may have stayed with several employers during
the program years. In many of the analyses that follow it is possible to use such
continuous variation in treatment, and therefore I construct a stock measure of
experience in addition to the dummies. This is done by attaching to each worker
information about his employers R&D investments, and adding up intensities in
R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D over the years 1986 to 1991. I use these
sums as measures of the human capital accumulated26.
3.4 A description of workers and firms by treatment cate-
gory
Descriptive statistics on workers and firms are given in the data appendix. IT R&D
firms are concentrated in the following industries: Computer and oﬃce machinery,
Other machinery, Radio, TV and communication equipment, Insulated cables and
wires, Professional and scientific instruments, and Photographic and optical goods.
Except for computers, non of these industries are dominated by IT R&D firms,
however. Subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms coexist in all industries
mentioned except in production of insulated cables and wires, where all workers
belong to subsidized firms. Other R&D firms and non-R&D firms are represented
in a wider set of subindustries than the IT R&D firms. These industries comprise
the production of various types of machinery, electrical equipment and transport
equipment27.
An important thing to notice is that the larger part of the IT-industry received
subsidies. There are 1095 scientists and engineers with at least one year of experience
25I have excluded women because they are known to have diﬀerent career patterns and preferences
than men, and do not constitute a large share of the labor stock in these industries.
26Since the intensities are measured in man-years per employee per year, the unit of the ‘expe-
rience stocks’ are years. This should not be interpreted literary, however. It will only be a precise
measure of individual R&D experience if all workers participate equally in the firms’ R&D projects.
This is obviously not the case, and one should rather think of R&D intensities as proxies for how
much there is to learn in a firm at a given time. Summing the intensities over the time dimension
then gives a measure of on-the-job learning.
27About 82 percent of the worker-year observations are from firms with R&D information avail-
able. Out of the 26 subindustries listed, 19 have some IT R&D investments.
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from subsidized IT-firms and 195 that only have IT experience from non-subsidized
firms. Given that the authorities were determined to stimulate the IT-industry, this
is perhaps not surprising, but it leaves a relatively small, and possibly non-random,
control group. That being said, however, there are relatively few observable diﬀer-
ences between workers in subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms. Scientists
and engineers in non-subsidized IT R&D-firms are slightly younger, but appear oth-
erwise similar to their colleagues in subsidized firms. Furthermore, my analysis is not
dependent on this dichotomus classification, as I also utilize continuous experience
variables as explained above28.
Subsidized firms are somewhat larger, more unionized and more likely to have a
rural location than non-subsidized firms. They are also more often foreign owned
and younger. The most interesting diﬀerence, however, is that subsidized firms
had significantly higher growth rates in the years preceding the awarded subsidies.
Presumably, recent success must have been an important criteria when subsidies
were awarded. With respect to intensity in R&D and IT-R&D the two group of
firms are close to identical. ‘Other R&D firms’ are somewhat less R&D intensive
than IT R&D-firms and have a slightly lower educational level, but they are on the
other hand more capital intensive. Non-R&D-firms have an even lower educational
level than R&D-firms and are more unionized and less often foreign owned. Non-
R&D firms are clearly the oldest group of firms.
With respect to educational composition, subsidized firms are slightly more di-
versified with respect to the human capital they possess than non-subsidized firms.
All R&D-firms, however, even non-IT firms, are highly intensive in various types
of electrotechnical engineering skills. Non-R&D firms also employ many workers of
this type, but mechanical engineers is the most dominant skill group in these firms.
Summing up the diﬀerences between subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-
firms, the main impression left by the descriptive statistics is that workers in subsi-
dized and non-subsidized firms are quite similar, although there are some diﬀerences
between the two types of firms. In particular, the technology programs seem to have
favored firms with rapid growth.
28This creates substantial variation, as subsidies were very unevenly distributed across firms.
This was part of a long tradition where ‘national champions’ were considered important catalysts
for growth.
9
4 A closer look at investments, performance and
labor mobility
4.1 Industry investments and growth
In the mid 1980s, the Norwegian economy was booming. At the same time, a
large number of firms received R&D subsidies from public technology programs.
Also, significant IT-related R&D contracts were given to the defence industry, and
in connection with the restructuring and modernization of the public telephone
company. The upper graph in Figure 1 shows total R&D investments in the high-
tech industries, i.e. ISIC 382-385 in the years 1984 to 1997. The middle graph shows
the share of these investments that were labelled information technology by the firms.
The lower graph shows the share of the IT investments that was subsidized. The
three graphs display a very similar pattern, with strong growth until 1987, and then
a decline until 1991. Several developments are behind these movements. First, after
the general expansion in the mid 1980s, the economy went into a downturn lasting
from 1988 to 1993. Next, as mentioned in the introduction, the leading technology
firm, Norsk Data, ran into trouble in the late 1980s and went out of business in
1991. Finally, the technology programs and large R&D-contracts came to an end.
An interesting feature in Figure 1 is that R&D investments in IT did not pick up
in parallel with the increase in total R&D investments when the economy started to
recover. This may be interpreted as an indication that the technology programs did
not produce a basis for new growth, at least not within the manufacturing sector.
The development of the subsidized firms is more clearly drawn out in Figure 2,
comparing employment growth in subsidized firms with employment growth in other
categories of high-tech firms. There is a strong decline in employment in subsidized
firms29. Given this picture, the dismal conclusion of Klette and Møen (1999)30,
evaluating the technology programs based on firm level data, are not surprising.
However, as discussed above and suggested by the quotes in the introduction, this
interpretation may be misleading. A more positive way to read Figure 2 is to stress
that workers were leaving the subsidized firms on a large scale, and that they may
have contributed to growth elsewhere.
Figure 3 pictures the growth in the Norwegian IT industry, as defined by OECD,
29Employment in non-subsidized R&D firms and other R&D firms appears to fluctuate more
than the other two categories simply because there are fewer workers behind these graphs. The
strong decline in employment for non-subsidized IT R&D firms from 1992 to 1993 is driven by one
single firm that ran into trouble. Much of the subsequent growth is due to the same firm recovering.
The negative employment growth in subsidized IT R&D firms is not driven by Norsk Data alone.
Leaving out this company does not alter the picture significantly. Furthermore, looking at sales
growth gives a very similar picture, but then I am not able to keep track of plants which change
industry classification from manufacturing to services.
30Cf. the introduction.
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from 1995 to 1999. In these years the IT service industry grew considerably faster
than the rest of the private sector. As suggested by the Research Council, work-
ers from previously subsidized manufacturing firms may have played a role in this
process.
4.2 Tracing workers out of the subsidized firms
A natural first step when analyzing R&D-spillovers brought about by labor mobility,
is to see where the technical expertise in the subsidized firms became employed
later on. The results of such an analysis are presented in Table 1. The first column
shows the industry of occupation in 1997 for scientists and engineers with experience
from subsidized firms. The main comparison group is scientists and engineers with
experience from IT R&D-firms that were not subsidized. These are tabulated in
column 2. Columns 3 and 4 give mobility patterns for scientists and engineers
with experience from other R&D-firms in the high-tech industries, i.e. firms whose
research activities were not strongly IT-related, and scientists and engineers without
experience from R&D-intensive firms.
The main diﬀerence between subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms is that
a much higher share of scientists and engineers from the subsidized firms has moved
to IT-service industries31. 30 percent of scientists and engineers from subsidized IT-
firms became employed in the IT-service industry32 versus 14 percent of scientists
and engineers with experience from non-subsidized IT-firms. The other columns
show that the less IT and R&D intensive the firms, the less likely are the scientists
and engineers to move to the IT service sector. The table suggests that the subsidized
IT-activities were service related, or at least that the IT-service industry oﬀered the
best opportunities for scientists and engineers from subsidized firms when these firms
closed down.
31IT service industries are defined according to OECD and with a few further refinements added
by Statistics Norway, cf. Statistics Denmark (2000). Included sub-industries are Wholesale of
radio and television goods (NACE 51433), Wholesale of oﬃce machinery and equipment (NACE
5164), Wholesale of machinery and equipment for trade, transport and services (NACE 51654),
Telecommunications (NACE 642), Renting of oﬃce machinery and equipment including comput-
ers (NACE 7133), Hardware consultancy (NACE 721), Software consultancy and supply (NACE
722), Data processing (NACE 723), Database activities (NACE 724), Maintenance and repair of
oﬃce, accounting and computer machinery (NACE 725), and Other computer related activities
(NACE 726). Corresponding ISIC codes are 61131, 61235, 7202, part of 833 and all of 8323 which
correspond to NACE 72.
32Looking separately at workers from Norsk Data, the share is as high as 46 percent.
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4.3 A brief summary of some ‘non-wage’ labor market out-
comes
The main message to take away from Table 1, is that the possibility of a link between
R&D subsidies awarded in the 1980s and growth in the IT-service sector in the 1990s,
is present in the data. Next, I investigate how workers from the subsidized firms
actually performed in the labor market. Were e.g. workers from the subsidized
firms “rather quickly absorbed” in the labor market, as claimed by the Research
Council?33. Some indicators that can throw light on this issue are reported in Table
2. Row 1 reports the share of displaced workers34 that did not become re-employed
in the same municipality35. Row 2 reports the share of workers who participated in
active labor market programs. Row 3 reports the average employment rate follow-
ing the program36, row 4 reports the share of workers who took further education
and finally row 5 reports the share of workers that became self-employed37. Taken
together, the results do not suggest that workers from subsidized firms had any
particular diﬃculties in finding new jobs. Having established this, I will move on to
analyze earnings.
5 Wage regression analyses
If know-how built up in the subsidized firms was not firm-specific and thus provided
a basis for growth in other firms later on, we would expect experience from subsidized
firms to have higher value in the labor market than experience from other firms. This
assertion can be tested using extended Mincer (1974) wage regressions. Lacking a
‘pre treatment’ period, I start out exploring scientists and engineers’ wage level
during the program. Next, I investigate wage growth following the program and
check the results obtained from these two analyses against the wage levels after the
program. Given that know-how built up in the industry leader Norsk Data has been
considered particularly valuable, and that about one quarter of all scientists and
33Cf. quoted in the introduction.
34I have defined a displaced worker as a worker with at least two years tenure who separated
from a plant that downsized at least 25 percent in that year or over that year and next year.
35Note that what is measured is a change in their home address municipality, not merely a change
in municipality of employment. The low number for workers from non-subsidized IT R&D firms
is due to one large firm that went through a mass lay-oﬀ, and then rehired many of the workers,
cf. the ‘dip’ for employment in non-subsidized IT R&D firms in Figure 2.
36Those not employed include everyone who are not employed and not under education, regard-
less of whether they are registered as unemployed or not. Part time workers are counted as part
time unemployed.
37These numbers may be artificially low. Presumably, they do not include workers who are
employed in joint-stock companies that they own themselves. Self-employed are included in the
wage analyses presented in the next section.
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engineers with experience from subsidized firms have worked for this company, I
investigate the robustness oﬀ all results with respect to leaving out these workers38.
5.1 The eﬀect of R&D and subsidies on wages during the
program
Several mechanisms related to R&D, IT and subsidies may possibly have aﬀected
wages during the program period. First and foremost, if scientists and engineers
expected to accumulate more general knowledge in subsidized firms (or in IT firms
in general) than in other firms, they should be willing to pay for this through lower
wages39. To the extent that subsidized firms promoted more advanced technolo-
gies, and technologies considered to have a large future potential, such investments
in general human capital are conceivable, although risk aversion and liquidity con-
straints may reduce the eﬀect. Another mechanism, possibly aﬀecting the wages, is
that subsidized firms may have employed scientists and engineers of better (unob-
served) quality. High-ability workers are necessary to develop frontier technologies,
but high-ability workers may also have a preference for working in a technologically
advanced environment40. The net eﬀect of this on wages is not obvious. On one
hand, high-ability workers have better outside options, but workers with a prefer-
ence for technologically advanced firms may, on the other hand, accept wages below
their outside option41. A final possible mechanism is unions. The wage level in sub-
sidized firms would be aﬀected if the workers were able to negotiate higher wages
and thereby extract some of the subsidies as rents.
Table 3 explores the wage level for prime aged male scientists and engineers in
high-tech industries in the program years by including measures of R&D, IT R&D
and subsidized IT R&D in a standard wage regressions. Both a dummy variable
approach (column 1 and 3) and a specification with continuous variables (column
2 and 4) are reported. The dummy approach utilizes the dummies for R&D firm,
IT R&D firm and subsidized IT R&D firm described in section 2. Note that these
dummies are nested in the sense that a subsidized firm is also an IT R&D firm which
is also an R&D firm. In specifications with continuous variables, I use intensities
38This procedure is intended to avoid a detailed and explicit wage analysis of this single company
and its employees.
39This follows from classical human capital theory, cf. Becker (1962, 1964) and the discussion
in Møen (2001).
40The work of Almeida and Kogut (1999), Stern (1999) and others suggests that scientists and
technical personnel have preferences regarding the technological environment they work in.
41Rosen (1986) provides a review of the theory of compensated diﬀerentials (equalizing diﬀer-
ences). Stern (1999) shows that this mechanism has relevance for scientists in the private sector.
This is, in the setting of my paper, supported by Steine (1992) who states that the company policy
of Norsk Data was to pay the same as similar firms, or somewhat less. He adds, “[i]t was attractive
to work in Norsk Data, so why be a wage leader?” (p. 50, my translation).
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measured as the share of the work force doing R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT
R&D. These variables are also nested, so that in order to find the total eﬀect of a
marginal increase in IT R&D due to a subsidized project, all three of the reported
coeﬃcients should be added.
In all regressions, workers in non-R&D firms is the baseline comparison group.
Non-reported control variables are listed in the subtext to the table. Among these
variables are 15 dummies for diﬀerent academic degrees, hence, scientists and engi-
neers are compared within detailed educational groups.
In Table 3, column 1 and 2, I do not distinguish between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D, and from Part A of the table, using the full sample, we see that
the wage level in IT R&D firms is significantly below the wage level in other R&D
firms. The average discount is between 2 and 3 percent. Non-IT R&D, however,
does not seem to aﬀect wages. When distinguishing between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D, a puzzling pattern appears. The dummy approach suggests that
the lower wage level is associated with work in subsidized firms while the specification
with continuous variables suggests that the lower wage level is associated with work
in non-subsidized firms.
A clue as to how these conflicting results can be reconciled can be found in Part B
of the table where workers from Norsk Data are excluded. Column 1 and 2, suggest
that the observed lower wage level in IT R&D firms is driven mainly by workers in
Norsk Data. If Norsk Data received enough IT subsidies per worker to be classified
as a subsidized firm, but had, relative to other firms, far higher total investments in
IT R&D per worker, this may explain the observed coeﬃcients in Part A, column
3 and 4. This is not inconceivable. When sources like Bjerkan and Nerg˚ard (1990)
describe Norsk Data as a thoroughly subsidized company, they are not so concerned
with direct R&D subsidies as with preferential public procurement, and Norsk Data
is in this respect a special case42. The company is also special in a diﬀerent respect
relevant for my analysis. The company was famous for rewarding their employees
with shares, something that received much attention in the business press. The
discount that the employees received when buying shares was counted as taxable
labor income and is therefore included in my wage measure43, but the stock market
price of the shares increased so rapidly and for so many consecutive years, that
the employees were likely to value the opportunity to buy shares in the company
highly and trade this oﬀ against ordinary wage compensation. Hence, some (but
probably not all, cf. footnote 41) of the apparent discount associated with Norsk
Data may be an artifact of the company’s unusual compensation scheme and not a
true compensating diﬀerential44.
42Cf. footnote 10.
43Cf. Steine (1992, p. 54-55).
44As far as I know, this wage policy was unique for Norsk Data at the time, as were their
consistently rising stock price. I should also mention that stock options were not much used in
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Looking at Table 3B, column 3 and 4, we see that even when workers from Norsk
Data are excluded, there is to be a wage discount associated with workers in sub-
sidized firms. Both the dummy specification and the intensity specification suggest
that the discount is slightly less than 2 percent compared to non-subsidized IT R&D
firms, although only the intensity specification produces a significant coeﬃcient45.
Above I have mentioned several mechanisms that may be behind this. In order
to distinguish between some of these possible mechanisms, the analysis in Table 4
can be extended by interacting R&D variables with experience, thereby examining
wage profiles rather than average wage levels. If the wage discount in subsidized
firms is due to workers investing in general human capital, one would expect it to
be associated with young workers taking a wage cut when entering the firms and
then experiencing stronger wage growth as their expectations about the value of
on-the-job training become fulfilled46.
Table 4 gives the results of including R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D,
interacted with workers’ experience. In column 1 and 2, we see that scientists and
engineers have a steeper wage profile in IT R&D firms than in other firms. Consistent
with the idea that IT is a general technology, cf. e.g. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995), these firms appear to oﬀer lower wages early in the career in exchange for
higher wage growth thereafter. The beginning wages in IT R&D-firms are about
10 percent lower than in other R&D firms, and the annual wage growth is about
0.5 percent higher47. Interestingly, there are no significant diﬀerences between R&D
firms that don’t specialize in IT and non-R&D firms.
Moving on to column 3 and 4, distinguishing between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D firms, one finds that the average wage discount associated with
subsidies in Table 4 is due to the wage profile in subsidized firms being less steep
the sample years. Due to a very unfavourable tax treatment between 1991 and 1999, it was not
much used in later years, either. For these reasons, I believe that labor earnings is a fairly accurate
measure of monetary compensation in other companies than Norsk Data.
45For the intensity specification, the discount is derived by multiplying the coeﬃcient -0.488 with
0.036, the employers’ average intensity in subsidized IT R&D, from table A2.
46Workers may also pay for learning through lower wages later in their career, but that will be
diﬃcult to separate from the wage premia they receive on their previous human capital investments,
cf. footnote 47 and Møen (2001). From a theoretical point of view, their willingness to invest in
human capital should fall gradually towards retirement.
47The dummy and the intensity specification give very similar results. Taking into account the
special wage policy of Norsk Data discussed above, and looking instead at part B, it may seem as
if 10 percent is rather on the big side. If the correct wage discount for entering workers is between
6 and 7 percent, and the wage growth between 0.4 and 0.5 percent, as suggested in Part B, this
imply a pay-back period of about 15 years. Notice also that the firms’ IT R&D-intensity times
experience is used as a proxy both for how much the workers are learning, and how much they
have learned on the job, cf. Møen (2001). IT R&D-intensity is a noisy variable, and as a proxy
for human capital, it probably becomes increasingly noisy the further into the career a worker has
reached. This implies that measurement errors may severely bias the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term towards zero.
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than the wage profile in non-subsidized firms. Hence, there is nothing in the data
suggesting that investments in general human capital were particularly large for
workers in subsidized firms.
5.2 The eﬀect of experience from subsidized firms on wages
later in the career
Table 5 contains the results of an analysis of the eﬀect of experience from R&D,
IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D-firms on ten year wage growth from 1986 and
1987 to 1996 and 1997. The advantage of looking at wage growth is that potential
diﬀerences in ability and preferences between workers are accounted for, and looking
at the full ten year interval takes one from one boom in the economy to the next.
This is desirable, since it may be diﬃcult to capture the full program eﬀect before
the labor market has adjusted to the many mass layoﬀs caused by the recession.
The sample consists of full time working male scientists and engineers, having at
least one year full time experience from high-tech or IT industries, including services,
in 1986-199748. Workers without experience from manufacturing, and hence not part
of the previous analysis, are included for two reasons. First, it has some interest to
compare workers entering the expanding IT service industries with background from
manufacturing high-tech industries to workers who have acquired most of their work
experience within the IT-service industries49. Second, these workers help identify
the many control variables in the wage regression, such as experience and dummies
for industries, altogether 72 coeﬃcients50. Given the relatively small number of
workers with experience from non-subsidized IT firms, it is important to identify
common coeﬃcients as precisely as possible51.
At first sight, the results in Table 5A, column 1 and 2, seem to imply that workers
in IT R&D firms have had significantly higher wage growth than other workers.
Looking, however, at column 3 and 4, and Part B, we see a pattern very similar
to the one found in Table 3 and discussed in detail above. This suggests that the
48The sample industries are high-tech and IT, defined as NACE 29-35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642,
7133 and 72. Cf. footnote 31 for more information.
49As it turns out, there does not seem to be any important diﬀerences between these groups, and
I have not tabulated separate coeﬃcients for workers that only have experience from IT service
industries. On average, these workers seem to receive slightly lower wages than workers with
experience from high-tech manufacturing.
50The industry dummies do not follow a particular NACE or ISIC level. Within high-tech and
IT-industries I use a detailed categorization, usually at the five digit level. In less advanced sectors,
with fewer observations in the sample, the dummies are usually at the two or three digit level. Cf.
the subtext to Table 5 for a full list of control variables an other details regarding the regression.
51The assumption that there is a common experience profile, common industry eﬀects and so
on, is of course not obvious, but it seems to be a reasonable approximation. Furthermore, my
conclusions are robust to reducing the sample size by excluding workers without experience from
firms that have invested in IT R&D.
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significant growth results are driven by a possible mismeasurement of compensation
for workers in Norsk Data in the beginning of the period. When excluding these
workers, there is only a small and non-significant wage growth eﬀect left, i.e. workers
with experience from IT R&D-firms have a slightly higher wage growth than workers
with experience from other firms, and workers with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-firms have a slightly higher wage growth than workers with experience from
non-subsidized IT R&D-firms, without any of these diﬀerences being significantly
diﬀerent from zero.
Table 6 reports the results of an analysis of the eﬀect of experience from R&D,
IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D-firms in the program years on wages in the years
1996 and 1997. Consistent with tables 3 and 5, the results show that there are no
significant diﬀerences related to these various types of experience. In particular,
workers with experience from subsidized firms, started out with a small but sig-
nificant (using the intensity specification) average wage discount, and had slightly
higher, but not significantly higher, wage growth, and they have ended up with a
slightly lower, although not significantly lower, wage level as reported in Table 652.
Changing the specification in Table 6 by including firm specific fixed eﬀects, and
thereby asking whether workers with experience from subsidized firms have ended
up in the best paid positions within their firms, give very similar results to the
specification without firm specific fixed eﬀects and is not reported. With respect
to workers with experience from Norsk Data, a detailed investigation of Table 6,
contrasting Part A with Part B in light of the previous discussion of subsidies and
IT R&D investments in this company, suggests that these workers have wages below
the average for other workers with experience from subsidized firms53.
Before concluding the wage analysis, one should reflect on how the results in
Table 5 and 6 relates to Table 4 which indicated that workers in IT R&D-firms,
whether subsidized or not, accepted a wage discount at the start of their career and
experienced higher wage growth later on. If the estimated wage growth associated
with a career in IT R&D firms had continued after the program period, it obviously
should have caused a significant positive coeﬃcient on experience from IT R&D
firms both in Table 5 and 654. When there is no such positive eﬀect, it implies that
these workers did not receive the return they expected. One possible interpretation
is that their expectations did not come through because of the technology shifts in
52If including the years 1994 and 1995 in addition to 1996 and 1997, the coeﬃcient on experience
from subsidized firms in column 4 becomes marginally significant.
53If running a similar regression for skilled workers with secondary technical education, however,
I find a significant positive wage premium for workers with experience from Norsk Data. This may
suggest that scientists and engineers accumulate more firm specific human capital, and is more
exposed to technological risk than workers with secondary technical education.
54In Table 6 this is so because the average worker with experience from IT R&D-firms, even if
continuing to invest in on-the-job training by staying in such a firm, should have caught up with
and passed workers without such experience by 1996/97.
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the IT-industry in the late 1980s.
Tables 3 through 6, can be summarized in one sentence: Scientists and engineers
with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms performed exactly as good, or rather
as bad, as workers from non-subsidized firms. Workers in all IT R&D firms seem
to have ‘co-financed’ their employers’ R&D investments by accepting wages below
their alternative wage, presumably believing that work experience from these firms
would provide general human capital. The expected wage growth, however, did not
materialize after the program period, leaving them no return on their investment.
With respect to workers in subsidized firms, they do not seem to have gained any-
thing from participating in the subsidized projects. Consequently, my analysis does
not support the idea that the IT R&D programs created significant benefits for work-
ers with experience from subsidized firms. On the positive side, however, workers
in subsidized firms did not perform particularly bad, either, even though many of
them became displaced in the late 1980s as shown in Figure 255.
6 The performance of spin-oﬀ firms
A complementary approach to looking at the performance of individual workers,
is to focus on the performance of spin-oﬀ firms defined by groups of workers that
have stayed together. When several workers from the same firm continue to work
together, it is reasonable to assume that they are exploiting know-how built up
in their previous work environment, and that there are positive complementarities
between them that make them stay together. It is also possible that firm profits
is a better performance measure than wages, particularly if the spin-oﬀ firms to
some extent are worker-owned. Low tax rate on capital income relative to labor
income may induce employee-owners to substitute wages for return on stocks56, and
employee-owners may also sacrifice wages in order to finance firm growth57.
6.1 Sample and definition of spin-oﬀs
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of my analysis of spin-oﬀ firms. Roughly speaking,
i.e. leaving out some of the finer details to be laid out below, I define a spin-oﬀ firm
55Note that I control for displacement in the wage regressions in Table 5 and 6, but the variable
is not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Distinguishing, however, between workers with experience
from subsidized firms who have stayed with the same firm, and separators, I find a modest negative
eﬀect for separators (not reported). In the stock specification this negative eﬀect is significant.
56Note, however, that the Norwegian tax system have detailed rules in order to avoid this type
of tax evation.
57One may also think that employee stock options plans would reduce the relevance of taxable
labor income as an earnings measure, and show up in firm profits. This kind of options, however,
has been very unusual in Norway due to an unfavorable tax regime, cf. footnote 44.
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as a firm that was not originally subsidized, but where at least 25 percent of the
employees have experience from a firm that was subsidized.
The sample period is 1994-1997, i.e. the years when the IT industry recovered
according to Figure 3. The sample consists of all non-financial joint-stock companies
with more than one employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries
with at least one ‘program firm’, i.e. a firm that to a large extent draw on human
capital with experience from subsidized IT R&D firms. Formally, I define program
firms as firms that have, at some point, had at least a 25 percent share of employees
with experience from subsidized firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with
experience from a subsidized firm. Any definition of this type will necessarily be a
bit arbitrary, but the idea is to identify firms that draw significantly on knowledge
that was built up under the program.
The definition of program firms does not distinguish between continuing sub-
sidized firms that has retained experienced workers, and new firms, spin-oﬀs, em-
ploying workers with experience from subsidized firms. This is because I want to
start out by tracing all firms drawing on ‘program know-how’. Utilizing information
about plants, however, I can identify those of the program firms that represent a
continuation of originally subsidized firms58. I label these ‘continuing or reorganized
subsidized firms’. This group of firms is defined as program firms that contain one
or more plant that in 1986-1990 belonged to a subsidized firm. Program firms that
do not fall into this category are defined as spin-oﬀ firms. According to the above
definitions, there are altogether 109 program firms in the sample, 76 of these are
spin-oﬀ firms and 33 are continuing or reorganized subsidized firms.
6.2 Descriptive statistics and results
Program firms are somewhat larger, more capital intensive, more R&D intensive,
and more intensive in use of scientists and engineers, than non-program firms, cf. the
data appendix. They are also somewhat younger and less often in a rural location.
Spin-oﬀ firms are significantly younger and smaller than continuing or reorganized
subsidized firms, as one would expect. Spin-oﬀs are also less R&D-intensive, but
more human capital intensive. This reflect that a larger fraction of the spin-oﬀ firms
belong to service industries. 37 percent of the spin-oﬀ firms can be identified as
spin-oﬀs from Norsk Data.
The first performance measure I consider is simply sales growth. The results are
reported in Table 7. Spin-oﬀ firms perform slightly better than other firms along this
58Firm identification numbers represent legal units, and will change if one firm or plant is bought
by another firm, etc. Plant identification numbers, on the other hand, will change only if the
production is physically moved or substantially altered with respect to industry classification.
Not all registers that are matched to produce my data set, however, use the same plant and firm
identification number system. For this reason the match between plants and firms, and the tracking
of units over time, is slightly imperfect.
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dimension, but the diﬀerence is not significant. Moving on to profitability, Table
8 presents return on sales, return on assets and return on equity. It shows that
program firms are significantly less profitable than other firms. On average they
have 1.2 percent lower return on sales, 3.2 percent lower return on assets and 15.5
percent lower return on equity.
Looking separately at spin-oﬀs and continuing or reorganized subsidized firms,
we see that the significant negative results are exclusively associated with the spin-
oﬀ firms. It is diﬃcult to explain these coeﬃcients, but one possibility is that the
spin-oﬀ firms mostly consist of troubled remnants of previously subsidized units,
and that they are kept running because their core know-how has low alternative
value59. Analyzing wages in spin-oﬀ firms (not reported), I find some support for
this hypothesis. Scientists and engineers with experience from subsidized firms that
work in spin-oﬀ firms, have a small wage discount. Workers with experience from
subsidized firms that work in continuing or reorganized subsidized firms, on the other
hand, have a significant wage premium60. This may suggest that the most valuable
know-how built up under the program is to be found in the surviving plants and not
in the spin-oﬀ firms. In any case, my analysis does not give support to the idea that
important returns from the IT-program ended up outside the originally subsidized
firms.
6.3 Robustness
In all the firm performance analyses presented above, I have controlled for firm
age, firm size, intensity in use of scientists and engineers, current R&D-investments,
business cycle eﬀects, and industry diﬀerences. The main results are robust to leav-
ing out these control variables, but without controls, also continuing or reorganized
subsidized firms have a profitability below average.
Since the exact definition of program and spin-oﬀ firms is based on a somewhat
arbitrary cutoﬀ value for the share of employees that has experience from firms that
received subsidies, it is particularly important to test the robustness of the results
with respect to these definitions. I have tried both a more inclusive definition,
looking at firms with a 10 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized
firms, and a more exclusive definition looking at firms with a 50 percent share of
employees with experience from subsidized firms. In both cases, the main results in
Tables 8 and 8 hold true. Defining spin-oﬀs based on the share of engineers with
experience from subsidized firms, rather than the share of employees with experience
from subsidized firms reduces the significance of the negative coeﬃcients. Finally, I
have looked specifically at spin-oﬀs from Norsk Data. If anything, these firms have
59E.g. sales or service departments, or production teams that move to a new location and try
to continue on their own.
60Cf. footnote 55, for a related non-reported analysis pointing in the same direction.
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a weaker performance than other spin-oﬀ firms. With respect to a possible time
trend in performance, cf. the strong industry growth present in Figure 3, I find that
the profitability of the spin-oﬀ firms is falling over time.
Given that the returns to innovation is known to have a very skewed distribution,
one may also question whether the regression analyses reported above correctly
represent aggregate profits for the diﬀerent categories of firms. A few large and
profitable spin-oﬀ firms could possibly more than outweigh the low profits in the
many small firms dominating the sample. One simple way to explore this issue is to
pool all spin-oﬀ firms, all continuing or reorganized subsidized firms, and all non-
subsidized and non-spin-oﬀ firms, in order to compute the joint performance of the
various groups. The result of this exercise is graphed in Figure 4. When assessing
the joint performance this way, spin-oﬀ firms as a group have a higher return on
sales than non-spin-oﬀ firms, but they perform worse with respect to sales growth,
return on assets and return on equity.
A final question one may ask with respect to robustness, is whether the results
are specifically related to the subsidized IT R&D firms, or whether any spin-oﬀ from
firms that invested in IT R&D in the late 1980s have performed similarly bad. I
have looked at this question by defining spin-oﬀs from all R&D firms and all IT
R&D firms in the same manner as I have defined spin-oﬀs from subsidized IT R&D
firms. This analysis (not reported) show that the negative results are most strongly
associated with spin-oﬀs from subsidized firms. There are, however, only six spin-
oﬀs from non-subsidized IT R&D firms in the sample. In a related analysis (also
not reported) I have regressed firm profitability on a continuous measure of diﬀerent
types of R&D experience among the firms’ scientists and engineers. In this analysis,
R&D-, IT R&D- and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured in the same way
as in the wage regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6. The results do not confirm
the negative eﬀect of subsidies found in the spin-oﬀ analysis, but nor do firms whose
scientists and engineers have particularly much experience from subsidized firms
perform significantly better.
6.4 Remarks on profitability as performance measure
An objection to the spin-oﬀ analysis might be that current sales and profitability are
not relevant performance measures in the IT industry, and that the spin-oﬀ firms
may become successes in the long run. Admittedly, numerous companies in the
“New Economy” have been unprofitable, and still highly valued in the stock market
due to large investments in intangible capital. These arguments are not entirely
convincing, however, as the stock market values such firms far less now than some
years ago. Also, private owners buying a company where previous owners have lost
their money, may make the company look successful and produce positive profits,
without there being a positive social return to the historical R&D investments that
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produced the technology. Comparing total investments to expected future profits is
diﬃcult and requires case studies.
A particularly interesting case in the Norwegian IT-industry is Dolphin Inter-
connect Solutions. This company has been considered the most successful spin-oﬀ
from Norsk Data, cf. section 2, but did not make positive profit in any of the sam-
ple years. The founding engineers started to develop the ‘Dolphin SCI technology’
in 1988 while still working for Norsk Data, and 1999 was the first year in history
that the company generated positive profits61. Rough calculations suggest that to-
tal investments in Dolphin amounts to about NOK 500 million62. In 2000 a major
part of Dolphin was sold to Sun Microsystems and the price, NOK 171 million, was
considered very favorable. Per employee, the price was NOK 8 million, something
which is more than 10 times the cost of an engineering man-year. However, if the
part of the company sold to Sun represents more than one third of the total value
of the company, the rate of return to Dolphin as an investments project has been
negative. A market based evaluation, therefore, is not likely to make Dolphin come
out as a large success.
7 Conclusion
This paper illustrates how matched employer-employee data can be used to assess
whether human capital built up in subsidized firms is general or specific. The case
considered is a series of Norwegian IT-programs from the mid and late 1980s. I find
no evidence suggesting that experience from subsidized firms has been rewarded
with a wage premium. Scientists and engineers with experience from subsidized
firms receive on average the same wage as otherwise similar workers without such
experience. This suggests that the return to the knowledge investments made by
the government and the workers themselves, was zero. One possible explanation is
that the technology shift in the late 1980s rendered much of the intellectual human
capital built up under the programs obsolete.
Analyzing the performance of spin-oﬀ firms reinforces this dismal conclusion.
Spin-oﬀs from subsidized firms are less profitable than other firms, suggesting that
the identified spin-oﬀs to a large extent consist of troubled remnants of previously
subsidized units. What keeps workers in these firms together may be a low alter-
native value of their know-how, rather than positive complementarities associated
with successful innovations. In any case, my analysis does not give support to the
idea that important returns from the IT-programs ended up outside the originally
61Cf. http://www.dolphinics.com.
62This number is calculated on the basis of articles written about Dolphin in the major newspa-
pers Aftenposten, Dagens Næringsliv and Bergens Tidene in the years 1991-2001. The number is
adjusted for inflation. Using an additional 7 percent discount factor, the total investment amounts
to NOK 800 milll. About 20 percent of the investments has been financed by public subsidies.
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subsidized firms.
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Data appendix
Information about individual workers comes from a number of governmental admin-
istrative records, which are prepared by Statistics Norway for research use. Barth
and Dale-Olsen (1999), appendix 2, give some details on the various registers in-
cluded in the data base. I have taken great care to improve the data quality by
checking for consistency across years and across related variables for the same indi-
vidual. Missing values are imputed where possible. The available registers cover the
years 1986 to 1997. Earnings is measured as taxable labor income. I have referred
to this as the workers’ wage. The value of stock options received in the employment
relationship is included in the workers’ taxable labor income after 1991. The use
of stock options, however, was negligible. Experience is measured as potential work
experience, i.e. age minus schooling minus seven.
Workers with earnings less than 150 000 1995 NOK are considered part time
workers, even if coded as full time employed, and are excluded from the wage regres-
sions. Likewise, workers who have not worked for a full calender year are excluded,
and also workers with missing educational information. Starting out with all male
workers that have had some sort of aﬃliation with high-tech or IT industries in
one of the years 1986 to 1997, and that were employed in at least one of the years
1986 to 1991, these trimming procedures reduce the total sample of worker-year
observations with about 14 percent, somewhat less, 9 percent, for graduate workers.
Plant level information about employers comes from the annual manufacturing
census of Statistics Norway63. Information about R&D at the line of business level
within firms is collected from R&D surveys and other surveys of immaterial invest-
ments and innovation. Prior to 1991 the R&D surveys were conducted by the Royal
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. In 1991 and later years,
the surveys have been conducted by Statistics Norway64. I merge the R&D data
to plants based on the plants’ firm number and three-digit industrial classification
code. This amounts to assuming that there are perfect R&D spillovers between
plants belonging to the same line of business within multi-plant firms.
In the machinery and equipment industries utilized in this study, the R&D sur-
veys have close to full coverage for firms with more than 20 employees. For years
and firms not covered by the R&D surveys, three other data sets has been utilized.
A survey of immaterial investments was conducted by Statistics Norway in 1988,
covering the years 1986-88, and in 1990 covering the years 1988-90. Furthermore,
an innovation survey was conducted by statistics Norway in 1993 for the year 1992.
These sources, however, do not contain information about the share of R&D that is
63The census is documented in the series Manufacturing statistics, Oﬃcial Statistics of Norway,
Statistics Norway, Oslo. The microdata are documented in a mimeo from 1991 by Halvorsen,
Jensen and Foyn in Statistics Norway.
64Microdata with the neccessary variables is available in 1984 and biannually 1985-97.
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IT-related, and also have limited information about subsidies. The data appendix
in Møen (2001) gives references to reports documenting the surveys, and describe
in detail the procedures used to combine the various sources when constructing the
R&D database. When possible, R&D-intensity and the share of IT-related R&D
is imputed by linear interpolation, and by extrapolating the first observed value
backwards in time and the last observed value forward in time, firm by firm. Firms’
R&D investments are known to be stable over time, and the subsidy and share of
IT R&D variables are only available from the biannual surveys. Imputing missing
information when possible, therefore, is a desirable procedure. R&D subsidies is a
less stable variable than the other two, however, and I have therefore extrapolated
this variable only one year forward.
Having performed the imputations described above, about 18 percent of the
worker-year observations still lack information about R&D-intensity, about 22 per-
cent still lack information about IT R&D-intensity and about 25 percent still lack
information about subsidies65. About 76 percent of the non-missing worker-year
observations of R&D investments are from surveys, 5 percent are imputed by in-
terpolation and 18 percent are imputed by extrapolation. About 62 percent of the
imputed R&D intensities are zero. With respect to subsidized IT R&D investments,
about 59 percent of the non-missing worker-year subsidy variables are from surveys,
and the rest are imputed. About 73 percent of the imputed subsidized IT R&D
intensities are zero. In the regressions, I account for missing R&D information by
using dummies.
The analysis of spin-oﬀ firms is based on the statistics of accounts for non-
financial joint-stock companies prepared by Creditinform and Statistics Norway66.
The accounts statistics are from the enterprises’ financial statements submitted an-
nually to the Register of Company Accounts in Brønnøysund and cover in principle
the entire population of non-financial joint-stock companies. An important advan-
tage of this data base is that it has information about firms outside the manufactur-
ing industry. Data are available from 1993. Firms with missing information about
return on sales, assets or equity have been excluded. This reduces the sample with 8
percent. The influence of outliers is reduced by replacing values for return on sales,
assets and equity below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and values above
the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
65For scientists and engineers the number is smaller, cf. Table A1.
66Cf. the annual statistics of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies, Statistics Norway,
for documentation.
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iFigure 1: R&D investments, IT-related R&D and subsidies to IT-related R&D
in high-tech industries in 1984-1997
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Source: Microdata from R&D surveys conducted by NTNF (The Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research) and Statistics Norway. Annual data points are connected using a cubic spline. High-tech
industries are defined as ISIC 382-385.
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Figure 2: Employment growth 1985-1997 in subsidized IT R&D-firms vs. other cathegories
of firms in the high-tech industry
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Subsidized IT R&D-firms are firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005 and intensity of IT-
related R&D above 0.1 in at least one of the years 1986-1990. Non-subsidized IT R&D-firms are less subsidized
firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1 in at least one of the years 1986-1990. Other R&D firms are
other firms with R&D intensity above 0.1 in at least one of the years 1986-1990. In 1985 there were about 11 100
workers in subsidized IT R&D firms, 1 800 workers in non-subsidized IT R&D firms, 5 800 workers in other R&D
firms and 58 600 workers in non-R&D firms. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the
three-digit line of business level within firms. Firms with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded. High-tech industries
are defined as ISIC 382-385. Firms that change industry classification are kept in the sample. Annual data points are
connected using a cubic spline.
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Figure 3: Employment growth in IT vs. all private industries in 1995-1999
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Source: Statistics Denmark (2000) updated with numbers from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no). IT-manufacturing is
defined as production of computers and office machinery, production of insulated wires and cables, production of
radio, TV and communication equipment, production of instruments except medical and surgical equipment (NACE
30, 313, 32, 332 and 333). The IT service sector comprises wholesaling, telecommunications and consultancy
(NACE 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133 and 72). The various IT sectors are defined as recommended by OECD,
except for wholesaling which is slightly more targeted towards IT. See Statistics Denmark (2000) for details. Total
private sector comprises NACE 15-37, 45, 50-74, 92 and 93. Annual data points are connected using a cubic spline.
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Figure 4: Joint growth and profitability of spin-off firms vs. non-spin-off firms
in 1994 to 1997
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Source: Statistics Norway, Statistics of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies. Both spin-off firms and continuing or
reorganized subsidized firm are defined as having had at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience
from subsidized IT R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. Together
these two groups of firms constitute the ‘program firms’. Spin-off firms are  program firms that do not contain a plant that has
been part of an originally subsidized firm. Continuing or reorganized subsidized firms are program firms that do contain a plant
that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. The sample consists of all firms with more than one employee and at least one
scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm.
vTable 1. Industry of occupation in 1997 for scientists and engineers with experience from
high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Workers
from
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from non-
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from
other
R&D
firms
Workers
from
non-R&D
firms
High-tech manufacturing industries 40% 53% 49% 44%
Other manufacturing industries 2% 4% 3% 7%
IT services industries 30% 14% 10% 6%
Other services industries 12% 14% 15% 23%
Public sector 5% 5% 6% 4%
Other industries or unknown 2% 1% 8% 8%
Not in the sample 9% 9% 9% 7%
Number of scientists and engineers      1095       195       465      1664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
at least one of the years 1986-1990. High tech manufacturing industries are defined as NACE 29-35 (ISIC382-385).
IT service industries are defined as NACE 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133 and 72. R&D firms are firms with R&D-
intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are R&D firms with intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-
firms are IT R&D-firms with intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. Non-R&D firms are firms that
have R&D intensity below 0.1. Workers are classified in the leftmost column applicable. Workers who are not
observed in 1997 are classified according to their industry of occupation in 1996, if possible. Otherwise they are
classified as not in the sample. R&D-intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of
business level within firms. Workers that only have experience from firms with unknown R&D-intensity are
excluded.
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Table 2. Non-wage labor market outcomes for scientists and engineers with experience from
high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Workers
from
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from non-
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from
other
R&D
firms
Workers
from
non-R&D
firms
Share of displaced workers that were
        re-employed in a different municipality‡ 11% 11% 14% 14%
Participated in active labor market programs 1988-1997 13% 11% 11% 11%
Average employment rate 1988-1997 88% 87% 89% 89%
Re-educated or further educated by 1997 2.1% 2.1% 1.7% 1.7%
Self-employed in at least one year after 1990 .01% .01% .02% .01%
Number of scientists and engineers  1095  195   465  1664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
at least one of the years 1986-1990. High tech manufacturing industries are defined as NACE 29-35 (ISIC382-385).
R&D firms are firms with R&D-intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are R&D firms with intensity of IT-related R&D
above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are IT R&D-firms with intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005.
Non-R&D firms are firms that have R&D intensity below 0.1. Workers are classified in the leftmost column
applicable. R&D-intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level
within firms. Workers that only have experience from firms with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded.
‡ A displaced worker is defined as a worker with at least two year tenure who left a plant that downsized at least 25
percent in that year or over that year and next year.
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Table 3. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies on the wage level for scientists and
engineers in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Intensity Dummy Intensity
R&D .007 .048 .005 .025
(.009) (.043) (.009) (.045)
IT R&D -.043*** -.245** .010 -.270***
(.008) (.061) (.015) (.065)
Subsidized IT R&D -.040*** .229*
(.014) (.121)
Number of observations  11 386  11 386  11 386  11 386
R-squared .50 .50 .51 .51
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D -.008 .022 -.009 .051
(.009) (.044) (.009) (.046)
IT R&D -.015* -.108* .0002 -.013
(.008) (.063) (.015) (.067)
Subsidized IT R&D -.019 -.488***
(.015) (.125)
R-squared .50 .50 .50 .50
Number of observations  10 513  10 513  10 513  10 513
The dependent variable is ln (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935 working full time in a (manufacturing) high-tech industry. High-tech industries are defined as ISIC 382-385
(NACE 29-35). The baseline comparison group is workers with experience from non-R&D firms. Control variables
included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, dummies for 15
different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, dummies for 3 different regions, year
dummies, 6 industry dummies and 3 dummies denoting whether the R&D, IT or subsidy variable is missing. The
coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated
error terms within individuals, are given in parentheses. In the dummy specifications, R&D firms are defined as
firms with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D
above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above
0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within
firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 4. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies on the wage profile for scientists and
engineers in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Intensity Dummy Intensity
R&D .015 .081 .013 .016
(.016) (.074) (.015) (.075)
R&D * experience -.001 -.004 -.001 .0001
(.001) (.005) (.001) (.005)
IT R&D -.109*** -.600*** -.088*** -.696***
(.015) (.104) (.023) (.108)
IT R&D * experience .006*** .031*** .007*** .037***
(.001) (.008) (.002) (.009)
Subsidized IT R&D -.027 .837***
(.022) (.205)
Subsidized IT R&D * experience -.001 -.051***
(.002) (.017)
R-squared .51 .51 .51 .51
Number of observations  11 386  11 386  11 386  11 386
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D -.004 .057 -.005 .049
(.015) (.075) (.015) (.075)
R&D * experience -.0004 -.004 -.0004 -.001
(.001) (.005) (.001) (.005)
IT R&D -.064*** -.426*** -.070*** -.426***
(.015) (.109) (.023) (.113)
IT R&D * experience .004*** .028*** .006*** .035***
(.001) (.008) (.002) (.009)
Subsidized IT R&D .009 .138
(.022) (.211)
Subsidized IT R&D * experience -.003 -.050***
(.002) (.017)
R-squared .51 .51 .51 .51
Number of observations  10 513  10 513  10 513  10 513
The dependent variable is ln (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935 working full time in a high-tech industry. High-tech industries are defined as ISIC 382-385 (NACE 29-35). The
baseline comparison group is workers with experience from non-R&D firms. Control variables included in the
regression, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose
starting date is censored at April 30th 1978 together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, dummies for
15 different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, dummies for 3 different regions, year
dummies, year dummies interacted with experience, 6 industry dummies, 3 dummies denoting whether the R&D, IT
or subsidy variable is missing and these dummies interacted with experience. The coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within individuals,
are given in parentheses. In the dummy specifications, R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above
0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-
firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is
measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 5. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies on wage growth 1986-1997 for scientists
and engineers in high-tech and IT industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Stock Dummy Stock
R&D-experience -.017 -.005 -.018 .003
(.018) (.031) (.018) (.030)
IT R&D-experience .042** .069* .003 .093**
(.018) (.038) (.028) (.042)
Subsidized IT R&D experience .047* -.155*
(.025) (.072)
R-squared .23 .23 .23 .23
Number of observations 7 130 7 130 7 130 7 130
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D-experience -.010 .015 -.011 .010
(.018) (.031) (.018) (.030)
IT R&D-experience .016 -.003 .011 -.008
(.018) (.039) (.028) (.034)
Subsidized IT R&D experience .007 .045
(.025) (.077)
R-squared .23 .23 .23 .23
Number of observations 6 762 6 762 6 762 6 762
The dependent variable is the first difference of ln (real annual earnings) between year t and year t-10 in the period
1986 to 1997. The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935, having some full time
experience in at least one of the years 1986-1990 and having full time experience in a high-tech or IT industry in at
least one of the years 1986-1997. High-tech and IT industries are defined as NACE 29-35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642,
7133 and 72. The latter six are IT service industries. The baseline comparison group is workers with experience from
non-R&D manufacturing high-tech firms. Control variables included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic
in experience a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose starting date is censored at April 30th 1978
together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, year dummies and dummies for 15 different academic
degrees, a dummy for having experience from IT service, but not from high-tech manufacturing in 1986-1990, a
dummy for not having experience from high-tech manufacturing, nor from IT service in 1986-1990, a dummy for
being displaced in one of the years 1986 to 1993, 28 dummies for industry of occupation at time t, 28 dummies for
industry of occupation at time t-10, two dummies denoting whether R&D or IT R&D is missing for those with
experience from manufacturing firms and a similar dummy for subsidized IT R&D in column 4. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms
within individuals, are given in parentheses. In columns 1, and 3, R&D experience is measured as having experience
from a firm with R&D intensity above 0.1. Likewise, IT R&D experience is measured as having experience from a
firm with intensity of IT R&D above 0.1, and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured as having experience from
a firm with intensity of subsidized IT R&D above 0.005. In columns 2, and 4, R&D experience is measured as the
sum of the employers’ R&D intensities over the years 1986-91. Likewise, IT R&D experience is measured as the
sum of the employers’ intensities in IT-related R&D and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured as the sum of
the employers’ intensities in subsidized IT-related R&D. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. R&D information is only available for manufacturing
firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
**  Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
xTable 6. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies in 1986-1990 on the wage level for scientists
and engineers in 1996 and 1997 in high-tech and IT industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Stock Dummy Stock
R&D-experience .012 .035 .012 .037
(.017) (.027) (.017) (.036)
IT R&D-experience -.007 -.021 .004 -.014
(.017) (.035) (.026) (.038)
Subsidized IT R&D experience -.012 -.041
(.024) (.082)
R-squared .21 .21 .21 .21
Number of observations 10 109 10 109 10 109 10 109
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D-experience .011 .031 .011 .033
(.017) (.027) (.017) (.027)
IT R&D-experience -.003 -.009 .005 .004
(.017) (.036) (.026) (.043)
Subsidized IT R&D experience -.009 -.059
(.025) (.093)
R-squared .22 .22 .22 .22
Number of observations 9 632 9 632 9 632 9 632
The dependent variable is ln (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935, having some full time experience in at least one of the years 1986-1990 and having full time experience in a
high-tech or IT industry in at least one of the years 1986-1997. High-tech and IT industries are defined as NACE 29-
35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133 and 72. The latter six are IT service industries. The baseline comparison group is
workers with experience from non-R&D (manufacturing) high-tech firms. Control variables included in the
regressions, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose
starting date is censored at April 30th 1978 together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, year dummies
and dummies for 15 different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, a dummy for being
displaced in one of the years 1986 to 1993, dummies for 3 different regions, a dummy for having experience from IT
service, but not from high-tech manufacturing in 1986-1990, a dummy for not having experience from high-tech
manufacturing, nor from IT service in 1986-1990, 28 industry dummies, two dummies denoting whether R&D or IT
R&D is missing for those with experience from manufacturing firms and a similar dummy for subsidized IT R&D in
column 4. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and correlated error terms within individuals, are given in parentheses. In columns 1, and 3, R&D experience is
measured as having experience from a firm with R&D intensity above 0.1. Likewise, IT R&D experience is
measured as having experience from a firm with intensity of IT R&D above 0.1, and subsidized IT R&D experience
is measured as having experience from a firm with intensity of subsidized IT R&D above 0.005. In columns 2, and 4,
R&D experience is measured as the sum of the employers’ R&D intensities over the years 1986-91. Likewise, IT
R&D experience is measured as the sum of the employers’ intensities in IT-related R&D and subsidized IT R&D
experience is measured as the sum of the employers’ intensities in subsidized IT-related R&D. R&D intensity is
measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. R&D information is
only available for manufacturing firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 7: Growth in 1994-1997 in firms that employ knowledge developed in the subsidized
IT R&D firms
(1) (2)
Dummy for program firm .064
(.044)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized firm .075
(.086)
Dummy for spin-off firm .060
(.045)
R-squared .93 .93
Number of observations 3 641 3 641
The dependent variable is ln(Sales). The sample consists of annual observations all firms with more than one
employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm. A program firm is
defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. A spin-off firm is
defined as a program firm that does not contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. A
continuing or reorganized subsidized firm is defined as a program firm that does contain a plant that has been part of
an originally subsidized firm. Control variables included in the regression, but not reported are ln(Sales t-1), a quartic
in firm age, a quartic in firm no. of employees, a quartic in the share of employees that are scientists and engineers, a
dummy for positive R&D-investments, a dummy for R&D-intensity above 0.05, a dummy for R&D-intensity above
0.2, a dummy for no information about R&D investments, year dummies and 38 NACE industry dummies. Firm age
is deliberately censored at 30 and firm no. of employees is censored at 1000. The coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within firms, are
given in parentheses. The influence of outliers is reduced by replacing values for return on sales, assets and equity
below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and values above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 8: Profitability in 1994-1998 in firms that employ knowledge developed in the
subsidized IT R&D firms
A: Return on sales (1) (2)
Dummy for program firm -1.22
(1.00)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized firm 1.57
(1.48)
Dummy for spin-off firm -2.56**
(1.24)
R-squared         .08        .08
B: Return on assets
Dummy for program firm -3.15*
(1.67)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized firm 1.25
(2.51)
Dummy for spin-off firm -5.26***
(2.00)
R-squared         .07        .08
C: Return on equity
Dummy for program firm -15.51**
(7.57)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized firm 2.57
(11.79)
Dummy for spin-off firm -24.19***
(8.68)
R-squared         .06        .06
Number of observations       3 719      3 719
The sample consists of annual observations all firms with more than one employee and at least one scientist or
engineer, in industries with at least one program firm. A program firm is defined as having had, at some point, at
least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or
engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. A spin-off firm is defined as a program firm that does not
contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. A continuing or reorganized subsidized firm is
defined as a program firm that does contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. Control
variables included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic in firm age, a quartic in firm no. of employees, a
quartic in the share of employees that are scientists and engineers, a dummy for positive R&D-investments, a dummy
for R&D-intensity above 0.05, a dummy for R&D-intensity above 0.2, a dummy for no information about R&D
investments, year dummies and 38 NACE industry dummies. Firm age is deliberately censored at 30 and firm no. of
employees is censored at 1000. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within firms, are given in parentheses. The influence of outliers is
reduced by replacing values for return on sales, assets and equity below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and
values above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table A1. Worker-year observations of scientists and engineers in high-tech industries by
ISIC sub-industry and firm type in 1986-1990
Sub.
IT R&D
firms
Non-
sub.
IT R&D
firms
Other
R&D
firms
Non-
R&D
firms
Firms
with un-
known
R&D
Firms’
IT R&D-
intensity
weighted
by no.
of obs.
38210 Engines and turbines 0 0 0 351 1 .0004
38220 Agricultural machinery 0 0 1 69 4 .0011
38230 Metal and wood-working machinery 0 0 0 5 0 .0000
38241 Oil and gas well machinery and tools 0 0 0 1 748 106 .0005
32249 Other industrial machinery 0 0 0 132 21 .0004
38250 Computers and office machinery 938 386 17 15 133 .1970
38291 Household machinery 0 0 0 17 17 .0000
38292 Repair of machinery 0 0 2 35 74 .0000
38299 Other machinery 327 30 233 767 190 .0441
38310 Electric motors and eq. for el. production 10 25 316 381 160 .0253
38320 Radio, TV and communication apparatus 1 123 145 660 790 421 .1262
38330 Electrical household appliances 0 0 25 14 1 .0513
38391 Insulated cables and wires 272 0 158 54 24 .1311
38399 Other electrical apparatus and equipment 7 15 5 87 42 .0852
38411 Building of ships 0 0 0 216 135 .0002
38412 Building of boats 0 0 0 19 17 .0000
38413 Ship and boat engines and motors 0 0 0 102 12 .0004
38414 Components and fixtures for ships/boats 0 0 13 102 17 .0006
38421 Railway and tramway equipment 0 0 0 29 0 .0000
38422 Repair of railway and tramway eq. 0 0 0 60 0 .0000
38430 Motor vehicles 19 0 5 102 54 .0804
38440 Motor cycles and bicycles 0 0 0 18 0 .0050
38450 Aircraft 0 0 0 128 0 .0006
38490 Other transport equipment 0 0 0 1 0 .0000
38510 Professional and scientific instruments 81 28 101 119 96 .1311
38520 Photographic and optical goods 34 17 11 0 0 .1580
382-385 All machinery and equipment industries 2 811 646 1 546 5 361 1 525 .0810
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 working full time in a high-tech industry (ISIC
382-385) in 1986-1990. R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as
R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an
intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at
the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Table A2. Characteristics of scientists and engineers by firm type in high-tech industries
Workers
from
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from non-
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Workers
from other
R&D
firms
Workers
from
non-
R&D
firms
Year of birth (average) 1953 1954 1953 1953
Years of tenure (average) ‡ 3.3 2.6 3.3 3.0
Years of education (average) 16.8 16.7 16.7 16.6
Wage in 1995 NOK (average) 350’ 347’ 377’ 352’
Union membership (share in 1991) 16% 13% 13% 18%
Rural residence (share) 6% 6% 10% 16%
Foreign born (share) 6% 4% 6% 7%
Employers’ average R&D intensity .19 .17 .13 .03
Employers’ average intensity of IT R&D .16 .16 .03 .01
Employers’ average intensity of subsidized IT R&D .036 .001 .006 .001
Obs. with R&D info. per worker 1986-91 (average) ‡‡ 3.8 3.4 2.7 3.0
Obs. per worker 1986-1990 (average) ‡‡ 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
Experience from Norsk Data (share) 26% 0% 0% 0%
Number of scientists and engineers 1 095 195 465 1 664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
(ISIC 382-385) at least one of the years 1986-1990. The statistics is based on the first observation of each worker.
Workers in firms with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. ‘Rural residence’ implies that the worker lives in a
municipality where firms have some sort of preferential tax treatment.
‡  8 percent of the observations have job starting date censored at April 30th 1978.
‡‡ Only workers who finished their education before 1986 and who were still employed after 1990 are included.
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Table A3. Educational composition by firm type in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Sub.
IT R&D
firms
Non-sub.
IT R&D
firms
Other
R&D
firms
Non-
R&D
firms
Total no.
of obs.
Total number of worker-year observations 18 170 4 296  15 114 173 756 211 336
Scientists and engineers 15% 15% 10% 3% 10 364
College degree in  technology 22% 18% 17% 7% 19 616
Secondary technical education 24% 27% 33% 46% 90 985
Higher general or administrative education 11% 9% 6% 3% 8 731
Secondary general or administrative education 18% 21% 19% 18% 38 685
Unskilled 8% 9% 14% 21% 40 193
Unknown education 2% 1% 1% 1% 2 762
100% 100% 100% 100%
Scientists and engineers 2 811 646 1 546 5 361 10 364
PhD Engineering 1% 1% 1% 2% 150
MSc Engineering Electrotechnics/Computers 45% 56% 53% 17% 3371
BSc Electrotechnical Engineering 15% 12% 13% 9% 1204
PhD Mathematics and natural science 2% 2% 1% 1% 143
MSc Mathematics 6% 4% 2% 1% 287
MSc Physics 5% 4% 2% 1% 297
MSc Engineering Machinery 6% 5% 9% 32% 2065
BSc Mechanical Engineering 1% 2% 2% 12% 710
MSc Engineering Architecture and Construction .1% 0% .5% 7% 375
MSc Engineering Chemistry and Geology 1% .5% 1% 2% 174
MSc Chemistry and Geology 1% 1% .5% .2% 48
MSc Life Sciences 1% 0% 1% 1% 102
MSc Natural Sciences, unspecified 4% 4% 6% 5% 476
MSc Other engineering 9% 9% 7% 7% 799
BSc Other Engineering 1% .2% 1% 3% 181
100% 100% 100% 100%
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born between 1935 and 1975 with full time experience from a
high-tech firm (ISIC 382-385) at least one of the years 1986-1990. Workers in firms with unknown R&D-intensity
are excluded. R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-
firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an
intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at
the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Table A4. Plant characteristics by firm type in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Non-
subsidized
IT R&D
firms
Other
R&D
firms
Non-
R&D
firms
Average number of employees 133 80 86 73
Average experience 16 16 16 18
Average tenure‡ 4.8 4.3 4.6 5.1
Average education 12.9 13.1 12.0 10.8
Average share of work force with higher           
technical or scientific education
.072 .070 .057 .009
Average hourly wage in 1995 NOK 176 183 180 165
Average capital per employee in 1995 NOK 772’ 798’ 1085’ 748’
Average R&D man-years per employee .28 .27 .21 .01
Average share of R&D that is IT-related .89 .91 .18 .04
Average IT R&D man-years per employee .24 .24 .03 .002
Average share of total R&D that is subsidized .19 .002 .15 .06
Average subs. IT R&D man-years per employee .045 .0004 .008 .0002
Average market share .063 .038 .028 .030
Average union density (1991) .42 .20 .32 .52
Plants with rural location (share) .25 .14 .25 .31
Share of work force that is foreign born .05 .05 .04 .04
Part of multi-plant firm (share) .61 .47 .45 .44
Part of foreign owned firm (share) .37 .14 .22 .08
Plants founded before 1966 (share) .15 .25 .27 .39
Annual growth rate in 1983-1986‡‡ .34 .19 .18 .19
Plant closed before 1994 (share) .46 .31 .33 .20
Number of plant-year observations 233 101 295 4 079
Number of plants 79 29 89 976
Number of firms 52 27 65 813
The statistics are based on all plant-year observations in ISIC 382-385 in 1986-1990. R&D firms are defined as firms
with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above
0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005.
R&D man-years per employee is measured at the three-digit line of business level within firms. Firms with unknown
R&D-intensity are excluded. Market share relates to national production and is measured at the five-digit line of
business level for the firm that the plant belongs to. Rural location implies that the firm is located in a municipality
where firms have some sort of preferential tax treatment. Multi-plant firms are only counted once in each industry-
year when computing the market share statistics. A foreign owned firm is a firm that has more than 50 percent
foreign ownership. The number of firms and plants refer to the number of unique firm and plant identifiers over the
years 1986-1990, and are classified according to the leftmost column applicable.
‡  18 percent of the underlying employee observations have the job starting date censored at April 30th 1978.
‡‡ The reported growth rates are the median within each group. Growth refers to growth in nominal sales.
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Table A5.  Characteristics of ‘program firms’ and spin-offs
Non-
program
firms
Program
firms
Program
firms that
are cont. or
reorganized
subsidized
firms
Program
firms
that are
spin-
offs
Average number of employees 116 176 253 129
Median number of employees 21 24 60 8
Average capital per employee 1 416’ 3 486’ 879’ 5 056’
Median capital per employee 551’ 657’ 769’ 533’
Average number of plants per firm 1.6 2.4 1.9 2.7
Average R&D man-years per employee .04 .13 .15 .10
Average share of scientists and engineers in the work force .16 .30 .17 .38
Average share of equity in total assets .31 .36 .35 .37
Average ownership share of the largest foreign owner .20 .20 .18 .20
Share of firms with rural location .14 .03 .00 .05
Share of firms founded before 1986 .41 .31 .60 .15
Share of firms founded before 1991 .75 .65 .96 .46
Share of firms classified as belonging to a high-tech or IT-industry .56 .78 1.00 .65
Share of firms classified as belonging to an IT-service industry .36 .34 .15 .46
Share of firms rooted  in Norsk Data 0 .24 .03 .37
Number of firm-year observations 3 643 274 103 171
Number of firms 1 437 109 33 76
The statistics are based on all firm-year observations in 1994-1998. The sample consists of all firms with more than
one employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm. A program firm is
defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. A spin-off firm is
defined as a program firm that does not contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. Firms that
are ‘rooted’ in Norsk Data are defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with
experience from Norsk Data, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from Norsk Data. Capital is
measured in nominal NOK. Rural location implies that the firm is located in a municipality where firms have some
sort of preferential tax treatment. High-tech and IT industries comprise NACE 29-35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133
and 72.
